Irina Tsukerman is a national security and human rights lawyer, journalist and geopolitical analyst, and contributor to the Arabian Peninsula Institute and the Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs.

According to a report in the Mirror, Hamza bin Laden, son of Osama bin Laden, is alive and leading al-Qaeda in Afghanistan. This contradicts earlier claims that he was killed in a CIA airstrike in 2019. Intelligence reports suggest that Hamza and his brother Abdullah are playing key roles in rebuilding al-Qaeda’s influence in the region.

If the Mirror’s revelations are true (and no one has denied them), the death of Osama’s son Hamza bin Laden was a bluff. How was it possible for the CIA and all intelligence agencies to be deceived in 2019?

Al-Qaeda and other terrorist leaders have a long history of faking their own deaths and deceiving intelligence. It has happened repeatedly with Al-Zawahiri, Al-Baghdadi and even Hassan Nasrallah and Hamas leaders. Thanks to the “fog of war,” it is easy for terrorists to change their appearance and hide in private homes or unknown bunkers until they are ready to make their move. They can continue to act silently for years because they are trained in hiding. Typically, only a very small group of trusted associates know they are alive or where they are; secrecy and compartmentalization complicate intelligence gathering. Subterfuge includes the use of false leaders and look-alikes to confuse intelligence signals. Terrorist organizations have also become more adept at effectively disseminating disinformation. The other side of the issue is the political failure of the United States. The CIA and other agencies have become extremely risk-averse in their use of human resources and have become increasingly reliant on technology, which can provide images, but not the interpretation or the story behind them. Both the Trump and Biden administrations, after the conclusion of the Doha agreement, had reasons to divert attention away from possible terrorist plots in Afghanistan, rather than open a political Pandora’s box on withdrawal. The Biden administration compounded the problem by ordering intelligence agencies not to talk to any human source from Afghanistan except the Taliban, which made it easy for the Taliban to mislead and manipulate the narrative. The Biden administration also lied by denying UN reports that indicated suspicious activities related to the camps and did not follow up on those reports.

Like his father, Hamza bin Laden is in Afghanistan. What is he doing?

Hamza Bin Laden would not be in Afghanistan without an explicit invitation and hospitality from the Taliban. Either he is a guest of a part of the Taliban network or he has been assigned specific facilities. He could be anywhere, given the extensive cave system in Afghanistan that makes it difficult to track his movements. He is probably also taking security measures to avoid staying in one place for too long, and may be traveling around the country to give moral support and guidance to fighters in training. Continuing his father’s legacy, he is probably dealing with senior al-Qaeda commanders, but he is also fostering diplomatic relations with the Taliban and other extremist and terrorist groups both inside and outside Afghanistan.

Is he the real leader of al-Qaeda or is Saif al-Adel the leader?

Most likely there is an equal division of power: Hamza bin Laden is the spiritual and political leader of al-Qaeda, while Saif al-Adel, as the most experienced fighter, is the military commander-in-chief. Al-Adel may also be a strategic planner of future major operations. The relationship is probably similar to the one Osama bin Laden had with al-Zawahiri. It is difficult to imagine that Hamza, criticised for his strategic failures and inexperience before his death, could single-handedly manage the oversight of all al-Qaeda military operations. Even his father was not known as a great warrior; on the contrary, he often appeared as something of a bungler whose greatest contribution to Al Qaeda was his PR value and his international relations.

If he really is as he appears to be in Afghanistan, the Taliban has been protecting him, and that is very worrying. What can happen?

Al Qaeda, together with the Taliban, has already built training camps for fighters throughout the country, preparing to expand their operations abroad. Al Qaeda was not part of the Doha agreement and is not obligated to fulfill its commitments. In the future, the world is likely to witness a repeat of the 9/11 scenario. For now, Al Qaeda’s leadership is busy transforming itself into a much more cohesive and formidable force than it was under Osama bin Laden‘s control. It is now much more like a paramilitary group, having transformed itself into a force similar to Hezbollah. It is integrating its relationships and centralizing capabilities by networking with other regional and international organisations, including ISIS-K, the Taliban itself, the Huthi in Yemen, Al Shabaab in Somalia, and other Muslim Brotherhood proxies such as Hamas. Al-Qaeda is also making a gradual return to the Middle East, this time focusing much more on building an international framework.

How is al-Qaeda funded today?

Al-Qaeda has a broader support base today than it did on 9/11, thanks to a closer relationship with the Taliban and Iran. It also receives support from its various affiliates and chapters – in the Arabian Peninsula, the Sahel, the Sahara and other parts of the Middle East. Its goal is to become more “mainstream,” as Hamas has done, and to push support for local programs to gain credibility from assorted groups before returning to the Caliphate narrative that, unlike ISIS, it has never been able to put into practice.

Does al-Qaeda have the capacity and strength to attack America or Europe?

Al-Qaeda is already much stronger than it was in 2001, but it will probably wait to strike the United States or Europe until conditions are ripe for it to do so: when there is maximum distraction and chaos, division among allies, and minimal allocation of counterterrorism resources. European security services have become adept at intercepting weapons and disruptive organizations at the height of ISIS activity in Europe; because of this, mass-scale attacks have been more difficult to enact, and so ISIS has shifted to smaller incidents. Al-Qaeda, which is already witnessing coordination between its Taliban ally and the GRU, Russia’s military intelligence, is waiting for the crisis involving Russia’s efforts to awaken its proxy network in Europe to reach its climax, and when Europe and the United States are in critical mode to deal with a number of other security issues, it will be the optimal time to strike. Terrorism is most effective when it is least expected and when countries are least prepared to deal with it.

It is clear that the al-Qaeda-Taliban-Afghanistan issue will become an issue again for the White House and the next U.S. president, responsible (along with allies) for the disastrous withdrawal from the country in 2021. If Harris wins, what will happen? What if Trump wins?

Regardless of who ends up in the White House after the November 2024 elections, it is almost inevitable that NATO forces will have to return to Afghanistan. The politicisation of intelligence, the weakening of military and intelligence relations with allies, and the distraction from a multitude of strategic and security issues will take their toll on U.S. counterterrorism. Currently, there is no effective counterterrorism and communication strategy. The penetration of security agencies and armed forces by Islamists and their defenders against jihadists weakens the resolve to decisively address both issues. Trump may be more willing to put financial pressure on the Taliban and Iran and crack down on some of the fellow travellers of al-Qaeda and new allies in the region, but he mostly avoids strategic confrontations and responds with force only to tactical confrontations. Harris is likely to continue to ignore threats except in situations where specific joint operations are unavoidable. Even those who believe he will have something to prove understand that he has no strategy for dealing with long-term strategic threats and is tied to the Biden administration’s response.

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